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COMMENT: THE FLINT WATER CRISIS: A NATIONAL
WARNING OF FAILING INFRASTRUCTURE
Andrew J. Lawton*
I look at the Flint, Michigan Water Crisis from a combined
perspective that broadens the scope of one of the worst manmade
environmental disasters in the history of the United States. The
goal of this examination is to bring attention to preventable
environmental catastrophes, and put a spotlight on the policies
and governing philosophies, which aggregated into neglect to the
health of the people of Flint. I briefly analyze Michigan’s
emergency manager law’s role in fostering the poor oversight that
allowed the crisis to spiral out of control. I then pivot to the
nation’s water infrastructure and regulatory environment at
large. Finally, I examine proposals of public policy for financing
the repair and removal of toxic lead pipes from other
municipalities. This paper highlights the dire consequences of
environmental degradation through lead and poorly managed
public utilities. It is my hope that such tragedies can be prevented
by an increased public awareness.

* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Marquette University Law School, May 2018.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Flint water crisis has proven to be one of the nation’s
worst environmental disasters.1 Thousands of Flint residents
have had inadequate access to water because of government
officials’ inability to properly treat the water supply being
diverted from the Flint river.2 Many have been sickened, now
suffer from lead poisoning, or worse, fatally succumbed to
mistreated water.3 This paper will focus on the legal and
bureaucratic mechanisms that allowed the crisis to unfold and
persist. In Michigan, particularly, the emergency manager law
the governor instituted to improve the state’s fiscal situation
allowed the crisis to go unnoticed and worsen.4 This law allowed
the governor to suspend local and city governments across the
state, and appoint a single person with the authority to manage
all operations of the city.5 Flint’s crisis, at least in part, stems
from a lack of care or accountability from emergency managers or
state officials.6
After looking at the local perspective of Flint, this paper’s
focus will shift to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and
the legal mechanisms that existed and failed to safeguard against
the poor decision making of Flint’s emergency manager. The EPA
was deterred by a dwindling allocation of funding and failed to act
when it had the clear authority to do so.7
1. Mark Berman & Brady Dennis, Flint Water Falls Below Federal Lead Limits,
but Residents are Still Asked to Use Filtered Water, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/01/24/flint-water-fallsbelow-federal-lead-limits-but-residents-still-asked-to-use-filtered-water/?utm_
term=.d3a30cdab9df [https://perma.cc/44KU-BVX6].
2. Id.
3. See Christianna Silva, Flint Now: Water Crisis Could Result in Manslaughter
Charge for Michigan’s Top Medical Official, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 10, 2017),
http://www.newsweek.com/flint-now-water-crisis-could-result-manslaughter-chargesmichigans-top-medical-681779
[https://perma.cc/V5SK-7Z32];
see
also
Jen
Christensen et al., Flint Lead Poisoning: Living With Uncertainty, Long-Term, CNN
(Mar. 5, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/04/health/flint-lead-exposure-long-termpain/index.html [https://perma.cc/9VQA-KU28].
4. Brie D. Sherwin, Pride and Prejudice and Administrative Zombies: How
Economic Woes, Outdated Environmental Regulations and State Exceptionalism
Failed Flint Michigan, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 653, 683 (2017).
5. See id. at 682-83.
6. Id at 663.
7. Watchdog: EPA Delayed Emergency Order for 7 Months in Flint Water Crisis,
CHI.
TRIB.
(Oct.
20,
2016),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nation
world/midwest/ct-watchdog-epa-delay-flint-water-crisis-20161020-story.html [https:
//perma.cc/U6KW-SHUK]; Glenn Thrush & Coral Davenport, Donald Trump Slashes
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Finally, this paper will advocate for broadly overhauling the
funding and bureaucratic structure, which failed to safeguard the
people of Flint and perhaps many other communities nationwide,
underscoring the national imperative for governments at all
levels to be properly funded for the good of public health. The
people of Flint’s concerns over the lack of the most basic of all
human needs, clean water, have been largely ignored.8 The
failure to properly address this crisis is a national failing that has
serious implications for other public health crises going forward.
II. FLINT: A FAMILIAR URBAN STORY IN CRISIS
On April 25, 2014, the city of Flint, Michigan switched its
water supply from Detroit to the Flint River to save the city a few
million dollars in costs while waiting for construction to finish on
a regional pipeline to supply water from Lake Huron.9
Regulations to prevent contamination of the water supply were
already in place through policies like the Safe Water Drinking
Act, which every municipality is required to comply with.10
Followed properly, these legislative acts have dramatically
improved drinking water quality since enactment.11 But in Flint,
these regulations were not followed properly, and scores of people
have been sickened or lead poisoned, and thousands more lacked
basic water access.12
The context for this bureaucratic failure is set by a common
story throughout the American Rust Belt.13 Flint is a city
Funds E.P.A. and State Department, N.Y. TIMES (Mar 15, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/15/us/politics/budget-epa-state-department-cuts.
html [https://perma.cc/58AG-P8MG].
8. Ryan Felton & Oliver Milman, Flint Water Crisis: Michigan Officials Ignored
EPA
Warnings
About
Toxicity,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Feb.
3,
2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/feb/03/flint-water-crisis-congressmichigan-officials-ignored-epa-warnings-lead [https://perma.cc/VK2B-HDT2].
9. Flint Water Crisis: A Timeline, MSNBC (Jan. 27, 2016), http://
www.msnbc.com/msnbc/flint-water-crisis-timeline [https://perma.cc/L4L9-79QJ].
10. See generally Safety of Public Water Systems, 42 U.S.C. § 300 (2010).
11. Celebrating a Public Protections Milestone: The 40th Anniversary of the Clean
Water Act, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.
foreffectivegov.org/clean-water-act-40th-anniversary [https://perma.cc/ TMV3-JCNV].
12. Merrit Kennedy, Led-Laced Water in Flint: A Step-by-Step Look at the
Makings of a Crisis, NPR (Apr. 20, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2016/04/20/465545378/lead-laced-water-in-flint-a-step-by-step-look-at-themakings-of-a-crisis [https://perma.cc/FY7U-QQMW].
13. STEVEN P. DANDANEAU, A TOWN ABANDONED: FLINT, MICHIGAN, CONFRONTS
DEINDUSTRIALIZATION xx (Larry Bennett & Ronald Edsforth eds., State University of
New York Press 1996).

LAWTONFINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

THE FLINT WATER CRISIS

4/10/18 2:59 PM

89

infamous for the closing of its auto plants, and serves as a case
study of globalization and corporate management squeezing great
industrial cities of their jobs.14 After World War II, the city was
an economic powerhouse with General Motors factories producing
Chevrolet cars and Buicks.15 But the plants closed in the 1980s,
which depressed the economy of Flint.16 The city has never really
recovered after the loss of the auto jobs and economic activity
associated with them.17 The United States census shows that by
2010, the city had lost almost a third of its population from the
1980s.18 Flint has been plagued by poverty and rampant crime,
averaging a violent crime rate four times the national average.19
Almost 42% of the city lives below the poverty line, and the
median income for a household is about $24,862.20 Cities like Flint
are horror stories of deindustrialization: the number of people
living in the city collapses, which leads to declining tax revenues,
which means fewer public services and a vicious spiral of economic
decline.21 All of these problems were further exacerbated by
economic downturns like the Great Recession in 2008.22 In 2012,
Flint was facing a $19 million deficit.23
These economic conditions have created a political
environment in which politicians have sought to impose strict
fiscal responsibility.24 This has generally included policies of cuts

14. Id. at xx-xxi.
15. Id.; Auto Industry, MICH. HIST., http://michiganhistory.leadr.msu.edu/autoindustry/ [https://perma.cc/3YVH-DPQZ] (last visited Nov. 2, 2017).
16. Dandaneau, supra note 13, at xxi.
17. Id.
18. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Flint City, Mich. (2010); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Flint
City, Mich. (1980).
19. Sarah Ganim & Linh Tran, How Tap Water Became Toxic in Flint, Michigan,
CNN (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/11/health/toxic-tap-water-flintmichigan/ [https://perma.cc/C4UG-4CEU]; Reported Annual Crime in Flint,
http://www.areavibes.com/flint-mi/crime/ [https://perma.cc/E5AB-UENK] (last visited
Nov. 2, 2017).
20. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Flint City, Mich. (2016).
21. Annie Snider, Flint’s Other Water Crisis: Money, POLITICO (Mar. 7, 2016),
https://www.politico.com/story/2016/03/flint-lead-water-contamination-money-220391
[https://perma.cc/3867-CG5T]; Dandaneau, supra note 13, at xx.
22. Edward Hoogterp, Great Recession Leaves Michigan Poorer, Census Numbers
Show, MICH. NEWS (Oct. 23, 2011), http://www.mlive.com/news/index.ssf
/2011/10/great_recession_leaves_michiga.html [https://perma.cc/DE7P-RGWU].
23. Steve Carmody, Flint May Pursue Loan to Pay Off Remaining Budget Deficit,
MICH. RADIO (April 9, 2015), http://michiganradio.org/post/flint-may-pursue-loan-payremaining-budget-deficit [https://perma.cc/JV3P-N3BB].
24. Eric Levitz, The Republican Party Must Answer for What It Did to Kansas
and
Louisiana, N.Y. MAG.
(Mar.
18,
2016),
http://nymag.com/daily/
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to both taxes and public spending for all things, including
infrastructure investment.25 This stringent governing philosophy
of the governors and legislatures in states, like Wisconsin,
Kansas, and Michigan, has led to vastly reduced public sectors
and investment.26 In 2011, Michigan Governor, Rick Snyder
signed Act 4, the state’s “emergency manager law.”27 This
measure had existed in some form since 1990, but was
strengthened by giving unchallenged authority to the managers
under Act 4.28 The act’s goal was to help cities in financial distress
like Flint and Detroit prosper again.29 The law allows a manager
to be appointed and in charge of a city’s finances and municipal
decisions, with the ability to override all measures emplaced by
the locally elected government.30 The manager can then sell off
any assets he or she desires to accomplish financial solvency,
while local government is unable to challenge any decision made
by the manager.31 A Federal Appeals Court recently upheld the
constitutionality of this law in September of 2016.32
Like much of the Rust Belt, Michigan is plagued by aging
water infrastructure that is in dire need of upgrade and funding.33
The American Society of Civil Engineers gave Michigan a grade
of D in its infrastructure investment in 2009, even before

intelligencer/2016/03/gop-must-answer-for-what-it-did-to-kansas.html
[https://
perma.cc/T3BX-7KYJ].
25. Id.
26. Id.; Lindsay Vanhulle, Budget Proposal Includes Spending, Cuts, Making
Room for Tax Cut or Debt Payments, CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS. (Apr. 24, 2017),
http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20170423/NEWS/170429949/budget-proposalincludes-spending-cuts-making-room-for-tax-cut-or
[https://perma.cc/5M3C-N79L];
David Bailey & Stefanie Carano, Wisconsin Governor Unveils Deep Spending Cuts,
REUTERS
(Mar.
1,
2011),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-wisconsinbudget/wisconsin-governor-unveils-deep-spending-cuts-idUSTRE72041C20110301
[https://perma.cc/7MHL-7APD].
27. Josh Hakala, How Did We Get Here? A Look Back at Michigan’s Emergency
Manager Law, MICH. RADIO (Feb. 3, 2016), http://michiganradio.org/post/how-did-weget-here-look-back-michigans-emergency-manager-law
[https://perma.cc/D77EJG95].
28. Id.
29. See Sherwin, supra note 4, at 682-83.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Matt Vasilogambros, Upholding Michigan’s Emergency Manager Law, THE
ATLANTIC (Sept. 12, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/09/
michigan-emergency-manager-law/499658/ [https://perma.cc/7S86-YENH].
33. 2009 Michigan Infrastructure Report Card, AM. SOC’Y OF CIV. ENGINEERS 1,17
(2009),
http://sections.asce.org/michigan/michiganreportcard/_files/ASCEMI-Infra
structure-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CCY-Q46M].
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Governor Snyder signed the emergency manager law.34 This
includes a D report card rating for drinking water infrastructure,
and a C rating for treating wastewater.35 The group estimates
that $13.8 billion is needed just in Michigan over the next 20 years
to make the necessary upgrades for safe drinking water, and an
additional $3.7 billion is needed for treating wastewater.36
Slashing public expenditure while balancing the need to
make necessary infrastructure upgrades is challenging.37 These
budget priorities and pressures in a struggling city like Flint
encouraged the emergency manager—whose primary focus was
stabilizing the city’s budget—to push the city to save a few million
dollars by immediately switching Flint’s water source while the
city prepared to pipe in water from Lake Huron.38 While the city
council symbolically supported the piping project to Lake Huron
by a 7-1 vote, the council did not make any decision in regards to
switching the city to the Flint River, and because of the emergency
manager law, had no power to make the decision anyway.39
III. BUREAUCRATIC FAILURE
A. Negligence on the Part of Michigan State
Government
The responsibility for the Flint water crisis falls, first and
foremost, on the officials of Flint and Michigan who repeatedly
failed to heed warning signs.40 The most obvious failure is that
the state government simply failed to properly test the water to
assure that it was safe for drinking.41 Given the city’s industrial
nature, the Flint River was victim to industrial runoff and waste
since at least the 1830s.42 Furthering the river’s poor health, the
auto manufacturers contributed their own share of chemicals over
the booming industrial periods.43 Raw sewage was also disposed
34. Id. at 1.
35. Id. at 15, 48.
36. Key Facts About Michigan’s In, AM. SOC’Y

OF CIV. ENGINEERS (2017),
https://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/MichiganFinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/8N9B-4Y5E].
37. See generally Vasilogambros, supra note 33.
38. Sherwin, supra note 4, at 683, 698.
39. Id. at 661.
40. Id. at 663, 696.
41. Id. at 661.
42. Id. at 658.
43. Id. at 659.
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of in the river, and evidence of runoff of ammonia, chlorine, and
phenol in the river is present.44
Multiple environmental
disasters, including several accidental exposures to waste from
ruptured sewer lines, also contribute to the river’s poor health.45
As early as 1999, James Helmstetter, the Genesee County
Director of Environmental Health, stated, “[a]s far as we know,
no [community] uses the Flint River for a drinking water source,”
in response to concerns about the excess pollution in the river.46
According to experts, this repeated pollution made the river
nineteen times more corrosive than the previous water system
used by Flint from Detroit.47 Given the river’s history and
exposure to various forms of pollution, the consequences of not
testing the water were catastrophic.48
In the summer of 2014, just a few months after the switch
from the Detroit water supply to the Flint River, residents in
parts of Flint were told by Flint officials to boil their water due to
elevated levels of E. Coli in the tap water.49 In June 2014, there
was an outbreak of Legionnaires disease, a pneumonia that forms
when water is exposed to untreated sewage.50 The outbreak
sickened eighty-nine and killed nine.51 To treat these problems,
the city put disinfectants into the water supply, a byproduct of
which was Trihalomethane (THM), a compound linked to organ
failure as well as cancer.52 State officials publicly said that the
outbreak of Legionnaires could not be linked to the Flint River
water supply, but privately, state officials expressed concerns in
internal emails of just that as early as October of 2014.53 In
January of 2015, an environmental health supervisor stated he
believed the outbreak closely corresponded with the switch to the
Flint River water supply,54 but a spokesman for the State
44. Id.
45. Id. at 659-60.
46. Id. at 660 (quoting Tim Carmondy, How Flint River Got so Toxic, THE VERGE
(Feb. 26, 2016), https://www.theverge.com/2016/2/26/11117022/flint-michigan-watercrisis-lead-pollution-history [https://perma.cc/24QB-CZG2]).
47. Ganim & Tran, supra note 19.
48. Sherwin, supra note 4, at 661.
49. Id. at 661-62.
50. Id. at 662-63.
51. Id. at 663.
52. Id. at 662.
53. Leonard N. Fleming & Michael Gerstein, Email: Legionnaires Assertion
Would
‘Inflame
Situation’,
THE
DETROIT
NEWS
(June
19,
2017),
http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/michigan/flint-water-crisis/2017/06/19/flintemails-legionnaires-water/103026954/ [https://perma.cc/3YPR-3XMW].
54. Jim Lynch, Michigan Officials Warned of Legionnaries’ Link, THE DETROIT
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Department of Environmental Protection declared the suggestion
“beyond irresponsible.”55
In February of 2015, a utilities administrator tested the lead
levels in the Flint family home of Lee Ann Walters.56 The
administrator told her that lead levels in her water showed 104
parts per billion in one test, and 397 in another, both far above
the federally mandated action level of 15 parts per billion.57 Her
four-year-old tested positive for lead poisoning.58 The city
continually assured her and the community that the water was
safe to drink.59 Walters contacted the EPA, and water specialist
Miguel Del Toral traveled to Flint to conduct a test of her water.60
Del Toral’s test revealed the water contained lead levels of 13,200
parts per billion, which is twice the level of what is considered
hazardous waste by the EPA.61
The high concentration of lead in the water can be attributed
to the toxic, bacteria-infested water’s severe corrosiveness.62
Because the Flint River’s water is nineteen times more corrosive
than the water from Detroit, toxic lead particles began flaking off
Flint’s pipes, allowing lead to leach into the city’s water.63
Residents immediately complained to the city about the color,
smell, and taste of the water.64 State officials continued to assure
residents that their water was completely safe to drink, as
Michigan employee Michael Prysby did when he issued a press
release for the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality
(MDEQ) on April 25, 2014, stating, “[t]he quality of the water
being put out meets all of our drinking water standards and Flint
water is safe to drink.”65
NEWS (Feb. 4, 2016) http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/michigan/flint-watercrisis/2016/02/04/flint-water-crisis-lehionnaires/79828822/
[https://perma.cc/6CS5B5W9].
55. Sherwin, supra note 4, at 664.
56. Id. at 664, 694.
57. Id. at 664, 693.
58. Id. at 664.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Ganim & Tran, supra note 19.
63. Id.
64. Julie Bosman et al., As Water Problems Grew, Officials Belittled Complaints
From Flint, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com
/2016/01/21/us/flint-michigan-lead-water-crisis.html [https://perma.cc/E5QM-QTJ7].
65. Merrit Kennedy, Lead-Laced Water in Flint: A Step-By-Step Look At The
Makings Of A Crisis, NPR (Apr. 20, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2016/04/20/465545378/lead-laced-water-in-water-in0flint-a-step-by-step-look-at-
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To control corrosion of pipes, cities are required by the EPA
to add corrosion control to the water supply to be within
compliance of the Federal Safe Water Drinking Act of 1974.66 The
act requires consistent testing and proper notice to users of the
water when contaminants are detected.67 Corrosion control of
lead pipes originated from the EPA in a 1991 regulation known as
the Lead and Copper Rule (LCR), which tried to mitigate the
immense costs required for upending the entire plumbing of the
U.S. to remove lead pipes68 (which was banned from use in
1986);69 as a stop gap measure, corrosion control chemicals create
a protective film coating on the inside of pipes to reduce the
leaching of lead from these pipes.70 The MDEQ simply failed to
require the city to implement this proper corrosion control, and
the corrosion of the pipes in the city caused irreversible damage
that couldn’t be fixed by belatedly applying the corrosion control.71
The addition of the proper, basic corrosion control to the Flint
water supply would have cost the city approximately one hundred
dollars per day.72
Marc Edwards, a scientist from Virginia Tech whose team
broke the story of the Flint contamination to the national media,
said that the MDEQ failed to meet testing protocol of water set
out by the EPA in critical ways.73 In February of 2015, the same
month Lee Ann Walter’s water was tested positive for harmful
levels of lead exposure, a state official at MDEQ inaccurately told
an EPA official that Flint had proper corrosion control in place.74
Additionally, the state denied that it was required to comply with
corrosion control until further testing had been completed.75 The
the-making-of-a-crisis [https://perma.cc/NUT7-N8YC ] (citing Press Release, City of
Flint, Mich. City Hall, City of Flint Officially Begins Using Flint River as Temporary
Primary Water Source (Apr. 25, 2014) (on file with City of Flint, Mich. City Hall).
66. Ganim & Tran, supra note 19; Sherwin, supra note 4, at 688.
67. Sherwin, supra note 4, at 688.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 688-89.
70. Id. at 691.
71. Id. at 692.
72. Ganim & Tran, supra note 19.
73. Sherwin, supra note 4, at 693.
74. Id. at 694; Lindsey Smith, State Admits Flint Did Not Follow Federal Rules
Designed to Keep Lead Out of Water, NPR MICH. RADIO (Oct. 18, 2015),
http://michiganradio.org/post/state-admits-flint-did-not-follow-federal-rules-designedkeep-lead-out-water [https://perma.cc/4MG3-MQ7H].
75. Mark Brush, Who’s to Blame for Flint’s Water Crisis? Virginia Tech
Researcher Points the Finger at MDEQ, NPR MICH. RADIO (Oct. 1, 2015),
http://michiganradio.org/post/whos-blame-flints-water-crisis-virginia-tech-
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state justified its sparse monitoring and quality standards by
pointing to a change in the Lead and Copper Rule regulation in
the year 2000, which allowed water quality departments more
relaxed standards for reporting and monitoring.76 Edwards found
the lead sampling the city conducted to be ineffective and
deliberately minimizing the results with incorrect testing
methodology.77 On July 28, 2015, the MDEQ tested seventy-one
samples where the 90th percentile measured at 18.8 parts per
billion with lead, notably 3.8 parts per billion higher than the
federally mandated action level of fifteen.78 On August 20, 2015,
two of the higher testing samples of lead parts were removed by
the MDEQ and water operating company, which reduced the 90th
percentile measurement down to 12.2 parts per billion.79 The
MDEQ claimed a sampling error.80
Marc Edwards further pointed out the failure of MDEQ
testing in a blog post:
“By law [under the Safe Water Drinking Act], at
least 50 percent of the homes sampled must be
verified to have lead pipe, and the remainder of
homes sampled must have been built before 1986
and known to have lead solder. There is no basis for
believing that this requirement was met in either
the 2014 or 2015 LCR sampling events conducted by
the City. Hence, the City of Flint has not had a valid
LCR sampling event since the switch to Flint River
water.”81
Health officials were failing in their duty to do basic testing
of the waters, and were using the LCR as an excuse for inaction.82

researcher-points-finger-mdeq [https://perma.cc/B7HA-CUBL].
76. Lead and Copper Rule: Drinking Water Requirements for States and Public
Water Systems, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/dwreginfo/leadand-copper-rule [https://perma.cc/G2MH-NQCH] (last visited Oct. 6, 2017).
77. Sherwin, supra note 4, at 694.
78. Id. at 695.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Marc Edwards et al., Commentary: MDEQ Mistakes and Deception Created
the Flint Water Crisis, FLINT WATER STUDY UPDATES (Sept. 30, 2015),
http://flintwaterstudy.org/2015/09/commentary-mdeq-mistakes-deception-flint-watercrisis/ [https://perma.cc/S5JW-DZ6B].
82. Brush, supra note 75; Lindsey Smith, Michigan Pushes to Have Nation’s
Toughest Lead Water Rules, NPR MICH. RADIO (Nov. 13, 2017),
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There is also evidence that state officials outside of the MDEQ
were concerned that the water switch was causing harm early
on.83 In October of 2014, emails from staffers within the
governor’s office expressed concern of a possible connection
between the Legionnaires outbreak and the new water supply.84
Michael Gadola, Governor Snyder’s legal counsel at the time, said
the city “should try to get back on the Detroit system as a stopgap
ASAP before this thing gets too far out of control.”85
As late as July of 2015, only a few months after tests were
showing harmful levels of lead, an MDEQ spokesman said,
“anyone who is concerned about lead in the drinking water in
Flint can relax.”86 Despite these huge warning flags and the
emergence of a real public health crisis, when the federal EPA
issued orders to Flint to act on the crisis, the MDEQ asserted that
the EPA lacked authority to order it to do anything:
We would note that under Section 1431, the
administrator has the authority to consult with the
State and local authorities to confirm the
correctness of the information on which [the order]
is based and to ascertain the action which such
authorities are or will be taking. We welcome such a
consultation.87
As of November 22, 2016, 2.5 years after the crisis began,
residents of Flint still did not have guaranteed access to clean
drinking water.88 The current Mayor of Flint isn’t confident that
https://www.npr.org/2017/11/13/563692086/michigan-pushes-to-have-nationstoughest-lead-water-rules [https://perma.cc/C79F-H597].
83. Matthew Dolan & Paul Egan, Top Snyder Aides Urged Going Back to Detroit
Water,
DETROIT
FREE
PRESS
(Feb.
26,
2016),
http://www.freep.com
/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-crisis/2016/02/26/flint-water-crisis-snyderdetroit/80926138/ [https://perma.cc/JBH2-A5GX].
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Lindsey Smith, Leaked Internal Memo Shows Federal Regulator’s Concerns
About Lead in Flint’s Water, NPR MICH. RADIO (July 13, 2015),
http//:michiganradio.org/post/leaked-internal-memo-shows-federal-regulator-sconcerns-about-lead-flint-s-water [https://perma.cc/A932-G5EK].
87. Sherwin, supra note 4, at 703 (quoting Letter from Keith Creagh, Dir., Mich.
Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, to Gina McCarthy, Adm’r, EPA (Jan. 22, 2016),
http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-01/documents/mdeq-response_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/84X2-L9LX]).
88. Katie Herzog, Flint Still Doesn’t Have Safe Drinking Water, BUS. INSIDER
(Nov. 22, 2016).
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she can recommend residents drink their tap water without a
filter for at least another two years either, when crews are
expected to finish removing every lead service line in the city.89
B. The EPA Did Not Sound the Alarm
The EPA also bears some blame in the agency’s decision not
to publicly raise the alarm. The EPA had the combination of
complaints from Flint citizens, warnings from EPA employees,
and the total authority through the Safe Water Drinking Act to
act on enforcing existing law that may have prevented the worst
damage now felt by Flint.90 Proposed solutions by the EPA ignore
the fact that these existing regulations were simply unenforced.91
While such regulatory changes might be a positive step, they do
not effectively address the serious deficiencies of the inter-agency
handling of the crisis as it unfolded.
In July 2015, after Miguel Del Toral conducted the test
showing lead contamination greater than twice the level of
hazardous waste in a home, he sent a memorandum to his
superiors: “[r]ecent drinking water sample results indicate the
presence of high lead results in the drinking water, which is to be
expected in a public water system that is not providing corrosion
control treatment.”92
EPA superiors, who appeared more
concerned with the appearance of sounding alarmist, brushed Del
Toral’s concerns aside.93 EPA supervisor Jennifer Crooks said in
an email, “I’ll bet that the state will take this personally since they
are responsible . . . which isn’t a bad thing, but they may get VERY
defensive.”94 When the internal memo was leaked to the ACLU
89. Jonathan Oosting, Flint: ‘All Clear’ For Drinking Water Still Years Away, THE
DETROIT NEWS (Mar. 7, 2017), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/michigan/flintwater-crisis/2017/03/07/flint-water-conference/98862674/
[https://perma.cc/G4KV943M].
90. Bosman et al., supra note 63; Safety of Public Water Systems, 42 U.S.C. §
300i (2002); see generally Sherwin, supra note 4.
91. See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, LEAD AND COPPER RULE
REVISIONS
WHITE
PAPER,
Oct.
26,
2016,
https://www.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/201610/documents/508_lcr_revisions_white_paper_final_10.26.16.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EAC9-UPZL].
92. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, HIGH LEAD LEVELS IN FLINT, MICHIGANINTERIM
REPORT,
June
24,
2015,
http://flintwaterstudy.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/11/Miguels-Memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZQ95-M28A].
93. Todd Spangler & Paul Egan, Emails: EPA Indecision Led to Inaction in Flint
Crisis,
DETROIT FREE PRESS
(May
13,
2016),
http://www.freep.com/
story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-crisis/2016/05/12/epa-concerns-contradictionsflint/84299484/ [https://perma.cc/6WMU-8H2A].
94. Id.
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in July of 2015, Region 5 director Susan Hedman apologized to
the Flint mayor for the information not being fully vetted.95 The
discrediting of Del Toral was underscored by the Flint Mayor’s
statement saying, “[i]t’s dangerous for a candidate to make
allegations that are not based on fact,” and an MDEQ spokesman
who said, “rogue employee” wrote the report.96
Despite the emergency powers that allow the EPA to act in
this situation97, they appeared more interested in applying nonpublic pressure to Michigan behind the scenes, as to not upset
Michigan state officials at MDEQ. This was evidenced by
Jennifer Crooks in another email where she wanted to avoid the
information coming off as “from my perspective . . .
aggressive/controversial.”98 “If there was ever a case where [the]
EPA should exert emergency powers and take primacy away from
an agency, this is it,” Marc Edwards said in a statement,99
referencing the text of the Safe Water Drinking Act which
provides the EPA with broad authority to dictate local
municipalities:
SDWA section 1431, 42 U.S.C. §300i gives the EPA
Administrator broad authority to act to protect the
health of persons in situations where there may be
an imminent and substantial endangerment.
Specifically, section 1431 provides that, upon
receipt of information that a contaminant that
is present in or likely to enter a public water
system or an underground source of drinking
water, or there is a threatened or potential terrorist
attack or other intentional act, that may present an
imminent and substantial endangerment to the
health of persons, the EPA Administrator may
take any action she deems necessary to protect
human health.100
95. Lindsey Smith, After Blowing the Whistle on Flint’s Water, EPA “Rogue
Employee” Been Silent. Until Now, MICH. RADIO (Jan. 21, 2016),
http://michiganradio.org/post/after-blowing-whistle-flints-water-epa-rogue-employeehas-been-silent-until-now [https://perma.cc/J9JV-QLNJ].
96. Id.; The EPA Flint Abdication, THE WALL STREET J. (Mar. 17, 2016)
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-epas-flint-abdication-1458258027 [https://perma.cc/
S47B-7CW4].
97. Brush, supra note 75.
98. Spangler & Egan, supra note 93.
99. Brush, supra note 75.
100. Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) and Federal Facilities: Enforcement, U.S.

LAWTONFINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

THE FLINT WATER CRISIS

4/10/18 2:59 PM

99

The failure to act on this authority in the face of an unfolding
catastrophe showcases a toxic political environment. It was
deemed less harmful for administrators in Michigan and the EPA
to simply sit on its hands, ignoring irrefutable evidence that
something was terribly wrong, than to act in the public interest.
IV. CAUSES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE
In proposing solutions, agencies and authors including the
EPA, suggest making changes to the Safe Water Drinking Act, the
LCR, in addition to providing better education for local
municipalities, and generally requiring better reporting to bring
concerns forward faster.101 But what these solutions ignore is
that the EPA had sufficient emergency authority powers to
respond to the Flint crisis like the extreme environmental
catastrophe it was.102
Michigan state officials—like those at the MDEQ—had
ample information to understand the basic dangers the Flint
water had.103 Furthermore, both officials in Michigan and the
EPA disregarded and lied about clear evidence that Flint’s water
had effectively been poisoned, and that its citizens were
experiencing harmful effects.104 The proposed reforms that target
the alleged confusion in water control action might be welcomed
by public observers, but the notion that these reforms would have
prevented the Flint crisis neglects to address the criminal
negligence of MDEQ officials.105 It should have been obvious with
basic research to MDEQ workers that the Flint water was toxic
and corrosive. Clear warning signs went ignored even after
numerous complaints.106 Failures to admit or recognize these
facts has created a severe health crisis that could result in the cost
of hundreds of millions of dollars in social and economic costs for
Flint, a city already reeling from the decline of the auto

ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/safe-drinking-wateract-sdwa-and-federal-facilities [https://perma.cc/742G-HEEC], (last visited Oct. 29,
2017) (emphasis added).
101. Sherwin, supra note 4, at 719.
102. Safety of Public Water Systems, 42 U.S.C. § 300hh (2006).
103. See Sherwin, supra note 4.
104. Id.
105. Sara Ganim & Ray Sanchez, Flint Water Crisis: New Criminal Charges Are
Brought, CNN (Aug. 3, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/29/us/flint-water-crisischarges/ [https://perma.cc/XC9C-5WDZ].
106. Id.
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industry.107
The EPA should have recognized the Flint water crisis
unfolding as a major public health emergency that required
immediate action. The EPA’s hesitance to sound public alarm
bells represents a horrifying failure of the core of what a federal
environmental agency is supposed to do. The necessary
regulations for the EPA to act were present and totally
sufficient.108 It rightly thought that it had proper authority to
intervene when it did, and yet it still waited nearly a year after
the initial reporting level for lead contamination was met and
internally reported by one of its agents.109
A better problem to address might be the institutional
culture that has contributed to the behaviors of state and federal
agencies here. What could be a far more determinative factor in
causing this crisis are the cold realities of finance and politics.110
The EPA is now a frequent target to the most critical
condemnations and political battles in Washington.111 In June of
2015, Republicans in the House Appropriations Committee
passed a bill that slashed the EPA’s funding by nine percent.112
The committee chair hailed the cuts as necessary to rein in an
“unnecessary, job-killing regulatory agenda.”113 Senate Majority
Leader Mitch McConnell called Obama administration regulatory
actions “an all-out assault on the American economy.”114 In
January, 2016, a year after the Flint crisis became a national
news story, Speaker of the House Paul Ryan wrote an op-ed
criticizing unrelated water regulations the EPA was proposing:
“Congress will continue to make sure people who depend upon

107. Josh Sanburn, Flint Water Crisis May Cost the City $400 Million in Long
Term Social Costs, TIME (Aug. 8, 2016), http://time.com/4441471/flint-water-leadpoisoning-costs/ [https://perma.cc/X3EB-YS47].
108. Safety of Public Water Systems, 42 U.S.C. § 300 (2006).
109. Smith, supra note 95.
110. Sherwin, supra note 4, at 697.
111. Jack Fitzpatrick, Cuts to EPA Staff Would Entail Political Battle Over
Regional Offices, MORNING CONSULT (Apr. 24, 2017), https://morningconsult.com
/2017/04/24/cuts-epa-staff-entail-political-battle-regional-offices/
[https://perma.cc/
FU9H-XKRK].
112. Devin Henry, House Panel Approves $30.17B Bill Cutting EPA Funds,
Blocking Rules, THE HILL (June 16, 2015), http://thehill.com/policy/energyenvironment/245137-house-panel-approves-3017b-bill-to-cut-epa-funds-block-climate
[https://perma.cc/UE6N-HNFG].
113. Id.
114. Geof Koss, Tempers Flare as Senate Panel Oks Interior-EPA Spending Bill,
GREENWIRE
(June
18,
2015),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060020491
[https://perma.cc/2Z5S-E8VY].
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this indispensable resource are not imperiled by an overzealous
federal bureaucracy.”115 Lawsuits regarding proposed power
plant and water regulations against the EPA have become
increasingly common as well.116
The point is not that everything the EPA proposes or does is
good or bad. The point is that the EPA is now seen by many states
and conservative leaders as an enemy regulatory agency and
political tool of radical environmental policy. As a result, the EPA
is facing a declining budget, numerous lawsuits, and severe
pushback from states.117 Given all of this, it is easier to
understand why the director of the EPA region overseeing Flint,
especially after reading Del Toral’s report, tried to quietly apply
pressure to MDEQ officials to start adding proper corrosion
control rather than asserting EPA emergency authority against a
state in the face of a public health catastrophe.118 The political
willpower to insert itself into the negligent action of state officials
carries necessary blowback. In released emails, EPA employees
expressed concern about the defensiveness they were likely to get
from telling MDEQ about problems in Flint.119 And indeed, state
officials at MDEQ were openly defiant until the crisis was in full
swing.120 Spokesmen and others in Michigan continually assured
Flint residents their water was fine, even though they were being
given every indication that it was not.121 The EPA has exercised
its emergency powers under section 1431 before,122 but the agency
has never faced the kind of local governmental pushback that it
has received from Michigan officials during this crisis.
115. Paul Ryan, Water Rules Show EPA’s Overreach, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD
(Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.omaha.com/opinion/paul-ryan-water-rules-show-epa-soverreach/article_79487f96-cca1-5afa-a194-4d63a398c2aa.html [https://perma.cc/H4
3U-PR5P].
116. Timothy Cama, Two Dozen States Sue Obama Over Coal Plant Emissions
Rule, THE HILL (Oct. 23, 2015), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/25785624-states-coal-company-sue-obama-over-climate-rule [https://perma.cc/GF8E-6EJ2].
117. Id.; see also Henry, supra note 112.
118. Spangler & Egan, supra note 93.
119. Id.
120. E-mail from Keith Creagh, Dir. Of Mich. Dep’t. of Envtl. Quality, to Gina
McCarthy, Adm’r U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency (Jan. 22, 2016) (on file with the Dep’t
of Envtl. Quality).
121. Kennedy, supra note 65.
122. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER ON
CONSENT
(Mar.
19,
2013),
https://www3.epa.gov/region10/pdf/sites/yaki
magw/consent_order_yakima_valley_dairies_march2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/454NGTPN]; U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER ON
CONSENT (Nov. 20, 2006), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-05/
documents/sdwadupont06.pdf [https://perma.cc/SE9N-43DN].
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Michigan officials at all levels were under intense pressure
to squeeze the budgets of troubled cities like Detroit and Flint,
and were disregarding common sense measures of public health
and safety.123 Emergency managers like the one in Flint are put
in charge to manage the city with the purpose of getting the deficit
under control. These managers act as political appointees with
no local accountability to the people that are most impacted by
these decisions.124
Critical observers have noted the
disproportionate effect on the poor and minority communities of
Flint, even suggesting that officials would be less likely to ignore
such warning signs in more affluent, white communities.125 A
pragmatic view from the eyes of Michigan officials obsessed with
budgetary matters makes a crisis such as this all but inevitable,
particularly for a poor community like Flint.126 In the wake of the
financial crisis that squeezed state resources, the most pressing
concern in their eyes was the red ink in the budget. As of June
14, 2017, fifteen people, including two former emergency
managers of Flint, have been charged by Michigan’s Attorney
General for crimes related to the crisis ranging from involuntary
manslaughter to obstruction of justice.127
V. PREVENTING FUTURE FLINTS
A. Immediate Relief
Flint is one of many aging industrial cities that were at risk
for a manmade catastrophe such as this.128 The EPA has flagged
many other cities in the rust belt, like Milwaukee, WI, as having
the same kinds of risks with lead pipes delivering drinking
water.129 Even replacing these lead lines for houses in cities can
123. Bosman et al., supra note 83.
124. Id.
125. Shawna J. Lee et al., Racial Inequality and the Implementation of Emergency
Management Laws in Economically Distressed Urban Areas, 70 CHILD AND YOUTH
SERVICES REV. 1, 1, 6 (2016).
126. Bosman et al., supra note 83.
127. Sara Ganim, Michigan Officials Charged in Flint Legionnaires’ Outbreak,
CNN (June 14, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/14/health/flint-water-crisislegionnaires-manslaughter-charges/index.html [https://perma.cc/DA7D-W3NR].
128. Michael Wines & John Schwartz, Unsafe Lead Levels in Tap Water Not
Limited to Flint, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2jLogr4
[https://perma.cc/L8NZ-JCWS].
129. John Seewer & David Eggert, Lead Pipes Lurk in Older Neighborhoods Across
the
Nation,
SUN-SENTINEL
(Jan.
23,
2016),
http://www.sunsentinel.com/news/nationworld/sfl-lead-pipes-lurk-in-older-neighborhoods-across-the-
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disturb the water systems and release toxic flakes.130 Short of an
entire infrastructure upgrade in both public and private property
throughout these cities, the danger of lead or other harmful
contamination to water supplies will be prone to potential
bureaucratic failures or changes in water chemistry.
The solution to both the problems of institutional indifference
in enforcing regulation and decrepit water infrastructure must
come from the federal government. State governments, usually
by law, cannot run budget deficits.131 Their resources and tax
bases are smaller, and the problems of water infrastructure
investment will cost billions for nearly every state government,
and by some estimates, up to several trillion dollars
nationwide.132 Contamination issues and lack of supply without
these upgrades will cost local economies like those in Flint
millions of dollars in worker output and domestic spending.133
The federal government, on the other hand, is not under the
constraint of running a balanced budget, as it can issue debt.134
It has the resources, but currently lacks the will to make the
massive investment needed to make base level improvements in
public health. Current programs like the Drinking Water State
Revolving Fund and Clean Water State Revolving Fund provide
capitalization grants and financing mechanisms to provide local
infrastructure upgrades.135 However, the improvements are
financially too small to make a large impact on national
infrastructure, and are at best stopgap measures to a national
problem that could lead to public health crises like Flint. In the
short term, what is widely accepted is the need for Flint and
similarly situated cities to provide lead filters to at risk residents

nation-20160123-story.html [https://perma.cc/2QP2-YYKZ].
130. Cheryl Corley, Chicago’s Upgrades to Aging Water Lines May Disturb Lead
Pipes, NPR (Apr. 14, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/04/14/474130954/chicagosupgrades-to-aging-water-lines-may-disturb-lead-pipes [https://perma.cc/T266-L3H8].
131. NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, STATE BALANCED BUDGET REQUIREMENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Apr. 12, 1999), http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/statebalanced-budget-requirements.aspx [https://perma.cc/M8XY-Z6N7].
132. 2013 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure, AM. SOC’Y OF CIV. ENGINEERS
1, 5 (Mar. 2013), http://2013.infrastructurereportcard.org/ [https://perma.cc/Q7CPCEAQ].
133. Sanburn, supra note 107.
134. GRANT A. DRIESSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40767, HOW TREASURY ISSUES
DEBT (2016).
135. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, LEARN ABOUT THE CLEAN WATER STATE
REVOLVING FUND (CWSRF) (2017), https://www.epa.gov/cwsrf/learn-about-cleanwater-state-revolving-fund-cwsrf [https://perma.cc/LD2A-ZE4G].

LAWTONFINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

104

4/10/18 2:59 PM

BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW[Vol. 19.1

who may have lead service lines.136 A combination of local, state,
and federal government funding needs to be allocated to these
communities immediately to prevent the present and real threat
of lead exposure, particularly for children, who are most at risk.
In the past twenty years, there have been great strides in new
filtration technologies like Granular Activated Carbon (GAC),
which has a lead removal effectiveness of over ninety-nine
percent, while also requiring only a fraction of operating costs
compared to other standard brand filters.137 The best short-term
solution is to apply massive and immediate filtration investment
to communities with lead pipes, delaying and mitigating the
potential long term social and economic costs associated with
accidental lead exposure through water systems, and therefore
providing the necessary relief of emergency conditions to allow the
fostering of carefully drafted plans by experts and lawmakers for
the long term.
B. Solutions for the Future
For long-term solutions to lead contamination in the water
supply, the United States will need to upgrade its entire aging
water infrastructure system, including replacing all the lead
service lines nationwide. What the federal government needs to
do is supercharge the funding for water structure and water
quality upgrades throughout the country in both infrastructure
spending and EPA enforcement. These are basic public health
investments that could boost economic activity, create thousands
of infrastructure jobs, and prevent more man-made catastrophe
like Flint from happening in the future. This funding will relieve
pressures on state budgets and embolden the EPA to act with
greater authority for the public good. The logistics of creating
such legislation and enforcement are straightforward. The
challenges of such legislation come from the political difficulty of
pushing through a bill with the price tag of trillions of dollars in
a clash of political will and fiscal choice.
But the costs of not upgrading the United States’ water
infrastructure are devastating.138 Estimates on the current
136. Jonathan Oosting & Michael Gerstein, Expert: Withouht Filter, No Water Safe
From
Lead
Pipes,
Detroit
News
(Spet.
28,
2016),
http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/michigan/flint-watercrisis/2016/09/28/snyder-flint-water-crisis/91213822/ [https://perma.cc/E3ND-QYPQ].
137. Mohamed Ahmedna et al., The Use of Nutshell Carbons in Drinking Water
Filters for Removal of Trace Metals, 38 WATER RESEARCH 1062, 1066-1067 (2004).
138. Am. Soc’y of Civ. Engineers, supra note 133, at 18.
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amount of water wasted each day in the United States through
leaky infrastructure total to around seven billion gallons per
day.139 An increasing population, the potential effects of climate
change, and contamination issues on a strained water supply will
only exacerbate the current water shortages that much of the
country faces.140 And it’s not just California that would be
effected. Forty states are projected to have water shortages in the
next few years, according to a Government Accountability Office
Survey in 2013.141 These conditions have the potential to
downsize prospects for economic growth and standards of living
for people all around the United States. The United States could
greatly benefit in treating water more like the precious
commodity it is. By instituting real pricing for water and
committing to strenuous conservation policies practiced by less
water rich nations,142 the United States could control water costs
and assure sufficient national supplies during periods of drought
or stress.
If water shortages and quality concerns are not enough to
entice lawmakers into large infrastructure projects, perhaps the
estimated economic benefits would.
The Economic Policy
Institute estimates that with just $250 billion of debt financed
investment into infrastructure projects, the United States
economy would expand by $400 billion, with a net increase of
three million jobs and increased levels of employment over the
seven-year life of that investment.143 Such investments would
also potentially improve economy wide productivity growth.144
The savings from a reduction in water loss would also help, given

139. Adam James, The U.S. Wastes 7 Billion Gallons of Drinking Water a Day: Can
Innovation Help Solve the Problem?, THINK PROGRESS (Nov. 3, 2011),
https://thinkprogress.org/the-u-s-wastes-7-billion-gallons-of-drinking-water-a-daycan-innovation-help-solve-the-problem-f7877d6e3574/
[https://perma.cc/BM9M9GDE].
140. James McBride, The Beleagured U.S. Water System, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS (July 8, 2017), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/beleaguered-us-watersystem [https://perma.cc/3Q77-N4AA].
141. Elaine S. Povich, Drought is Not Just a California Problem, USA TODAY (Apr.
18,
2015),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/04/18/californiadrought-nationwide/25999193/ [https://perma.cc/4HFT-S58N].
142. See SETH SIEGEL, LET THERE BE WATER: ISRAEL’S SOLUTION TO A WATER
STARVED WORLD 17-45 (2015).
143. Josh Bivens, The Short- and Long-Term Impact of Infrastructure Investments
on Employment and Economic Activity in the U.S. Economy, ECON. POL’Y INST. (July
1,
2014),
http://www.epi.org/publication/impact-of-infrastructure-investments/
[https://perma.cc/JJX2-VWFC].
144. Id.
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the cost of pumping seven billion gallons of water per day that
goes to waste.145 Those water savings could be rolled into new
agriculture or industrial development, as well as improving
municipal functions and costs. These economic benefits would
provide an infrastructure upgrade that could be the foundation
for further growth and better urban development.
VI. CONCLUSION
What should be the final motivating straw for lawmakers,
however, is looking at the devastating effects of water
contamination that to this day are plaguing Flint.146 The
economic impact and social costs of dealing with the crisis will not
be fully realized for decades.147 While the fixes proposed by
legislators to require notifying the public of water quality issues
or requiring clarifiers in the Lead Copper Rules aren’t
meaningless, the emergency regulatory mechanisms were already
in place for the EPA to enforce failures in inspection and water
treatment in Flint.148 These mechanisms were either ignored or
not given proper weight to the magnitude of the developing
problems in the city. It just isn’t clear that anything will be as
effective at preventing another Flint crisis in the short term but
the embarrassment of the EPA and MDEQ officials. But that
embarrassment will eventually subside. The EPA has flexed its
ability to exercise emergency authority powers before under
section 1431, particularly against private entities.149 But this
author could not find a comparable instance in which the EPA was
under the pressure of state and local government resisting and
disputing facts on the ground. Proposed legislative fixes requiring
stricter standards simply reinforce what was already the job of
both state and federal agencies.150 But a dedication to water
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

James, supra note 141.
Herzog, supra note 87.
Sanburn, supra note 107.
Spangler & Egan, supra note 93.
U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER ON
CONSENT
(Mar.
19,
2013),
https://www3.epa.gov/region10/pdf/sites/yaki
magw/consent_order_yakima_valley_dairies_march2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/KX68ZV5Z]; U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER ON
CONSENT (Nov. 20, 2006), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201605/documents/sdwadupont06.pdf [https://perma.cc/SE9N-43DN].
150. Greg Botelho, No Simple Fix: Infrastructure, Health Issues Loom Large in
Flint Water Crisis, CNN (Jan. 19, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/19/us/flintwater-crisis-whats-next/index.html [https://perma.cc/BBQ2-UDV8]; Josh Sanburn,
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infrastructure innovation at the federal level would relieve some
of the budgetary pressures off these agencies and other state
governments to hopefully discourage future negligent or careless
action. In March of 2017, the EPA awarded $100 million to
Michigan to improve water infrastructure in Flint.151 This much
needed funding was supplemented by the State of Michigan after
it agreed to settle a class action lawsuit and set aside $97 million
to replace the water lines of at least eighteen thousand Flint
households by 2020.152 In continuing to pursue the dire needs of
water infrastructure repair, this country has the opportunity to
make major improvements in national public health, and to head
off future disastrous water crises like Flint.

Why the EPA is Partly to Blame for the Flint Water Crisis, TIME (Jan. 22, 2016),
http://time.com/4190643/flint-water-crisis-susan-hedman-epa/
[https://perma.cc/MZ2P-QJ7R].
151. EPA Awards $100 Million to Michigan for Flint Water Infrastructure
Upgrades,
U.S.
ENVTL.
PROTCETION
AGENCY
(Mar.
17,
2017),
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-awards-100-million-michigan-flint-waterinfrastructure-upgrades [https://perma.cc/49DC-6QMV].
152. Chris Boyette, Michigan and Flint Agree to Replace 18,000 Home Water Lines
by 2020, CNN (Mar. 27, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/27/us/flintsettlement/index.html [https://perma.cc/L27T-A37T].
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